EconWorks Podcast

40 Episodes
Subscribe

By: EconWorks

Industrial organization insights on antitrust, digital platforms, and competition in ecosystem markets. blog.econworks.com

✂️ Turn this podcast into clips
Chegg vs. Google: Why Students May Prefer AI Tutors
Chegg vs. Google: Why Students May Prefer AI Tutors episode artwork
Today at 11:29 AM

Chegg has sued Google, claiming the search giant has used publishers’ content in its AI Overviews to give consumers answers directly, causing a drop in traffic and revenue. But what if the real competitive challenge is that students increasingly prefer interactive AI tutoring to prepared explanations? In this episode of EconWorks, we take an economist’s view of the Chegg–Google antitrust case. A student wants to understand a problem, not necessarily buy a ready-made solution. ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and Grok can explain, answer follow-up questions, and customize their responses to the individual’s needs. Two simple examples of a train...


FluxCap’s AI Bet: What Stops Others from Copying It?
FluxCap’s AI Bet: What Stops Others from Copying It? episode artwork
Yesterday at 12:04 PM

Can AI help a small legal team take on a much bigger adversary—and what’s holding other firms back from building similar tools?

One place to start digging into these questions is FluxCap, launched by former Justice Department antitrust leaders Jonathan Kanter and Doha Mekki.

We explain why finding a document is not the same as knowing what it proves, how economic consultancies and law firms might build alternatives, and why the existence of confidential client information makes it difficult to assume that more users will automatically make for better AI. EconWorks builds on our...


Who Decides When AI Is Safe Enough?
Who Decides When AI Is Safe Enough? episode artwork
Last Friday at 11:57 AM

Who should decide when an AI model is safe enough to release?

AI companies have a responsibility to develop safe products. But does that responsibility allow competing developers to collectively restrict innovation?

In this episode of EconWorks, we explore the tension between AI safety and antitrust law.

We start with an unusual example: an agreement among competitors to lower prices. Even when consumers appear to benefit, such an agreement can violate antitrust law.

We then examine two Supreme Court cases that help explain why some forms of cooperation are lawful while...


Can AI Stop Cartels Without Detecting Them?
Can AI Stop Cartels Without Detecting Them? episode artwork
Last Thursday at 12:48 PM

Why do cartels continue to exist? And could AI make them less profitable without ever discovering an illegal agreement?

In the final episode of How Cartels Really Work, EconWorks examines how artificial intelligence could change the incentives that make cartels profitable.

We begin with a simple hypothetical: An economy contains 1,000 cartels. AI could make collusion easier, increasing their number to 10,000, or strengthen competitive pressures, reducing their number to 100.

Either way, some cartels remain profitable.

We explore why detecting illegal agreements is difficult and revisit the Nasdaq market-maker case, where unusual pricing...


AI Safety or Collusion? Who Gets to Decide?
AI Safety or Collusion? Who Gets to Decide? episode artwork
11/11/2026

Developers of AI have expressed concerns about the dangers of increasingly powerful artificial... But could their safety pact lead to antitrust problems if rival firms collectively cut back on innovation? On this edition of EconWorks, we take a look at the difference between legitimate cooperation and agreements that restrain competition. Let us begin with a simple question. If competitors cannot agree to fix prices, even at lower levels, when can they legitimately collaborate? Two landmark decisions in the Supreme Court provide some important insights: - Broadcast Music v. CBS (1979): Joint efforts by competitors that result in valuable goods and...


Can AI Stop Cartels Without Detecting Them? | How Cartels Really Work — Ep. 10
Can AI Stop Cartels Without Detecting Them? | How Cartels Really Work — Ep. 10 episode artwork
11/10/2026

Why are cartels still around when they are illegal? And could an artificial intelligence make them less profitable without even detecting them?In the last episode of How Cartels Really Work, EconWorks explores how AI may alter the economic incentives behind collusion.Suppose an economy with 1,000 cartels. AI could make coordination easier, and the number of cartels could rise to 10,000. Or AI could increase competition and take the number down to 100.But even if there are only 100 cartels left, the basic question remains: Why do firms keep colluding?We discuss the problem of detecting cartels, and we use the...


DoorDash–Instacart: Two Shoppers, Two Competition Stories
DoorDash–Instacart: Two Shoppers, Two Competition Stories episode artwork
11/06/2026

Do you choose your supermarket first, or open a delivery app and then decide where to shop?

That everyday decision provides a starting point for understanding DoorDash’s proposed acquisition of Instacart. In this EconWorks conversation, we follow two hypothetical neighbors whose grocery orders look identical but whose alternatives may differ.

Could retailer delivery keep prices competitive? Would combining memberships benefit households? Could different discounts leave some shoppers more exposed to the loss of rivalry? And what evidence would show whether the merger’s promised savings outweigh its pricing incentives?

We explore both the...


Bid Rigging: Can AI Help Buyers Design Better Auctions?
Bid Rigging: Can AI Help Buyers Design Better Auctions? episode artwork
11/05/2026

Three companies bid on a government contract. One wins, the rest lose.But what if the companies agreed on the winner before they made their bids?In Episode 9 of How Cartels Really Work, EconWorks explores the economics of bid rigging using a real U.S. school bus cartel case.In United States v. Southwest Bus Sales (1994), the school bus distributors coordinated their bids and divided contracts amongst themselves. But the case also raises an interesting economic question: Were the school districts capable of designing better auctions?Bus manufacturers sold to the distributors and could offer them wholesale price breaks...


DoorDash–Instacart: Will Your Delivery Cost More?
DoorDash–Instacart: Will Your Delivery Cost More? episode artwork
11/04/2026

Two neighbors order the same groceries from the same supermarket. One chooses the store first. The other opens a delivery app first. Could DoorDash’s proposed acquisition of Instacart affect them differently?

This EconWorks episode explores how people choose grocery delivery, when a supermarket’s own service provides an alternative, and why switching between DoorDash and Instacart matters after common ownership.

We also examine market shares, personalized offers, and the potential savings from combining delivery operations. The question is whether consumers would face better or worse terms than if the companies continued competing.

Anna...


Bid Rigging: Can AI Help Buyers Fight Cartels? | How Cartels Really Work Ep. 9
Bid Rigging: Can AI Help Buyers Fight Cartels? | How Cartels Really Work Ep. 9 episode artwork
11/03/2026

Three companies bid on a government contract. One wins, the others lose.

But what if the companies agreed on the winner before they placed their bids?

In Episode 9 of How Cartels Really Work, EconWorks takes a look at the economics of bid rigging, using a real U.S. school bus cartel case.

In United States v. Southwest Bus Sales (1994), the distributors of school busses had coordinated their bids and divided contracts among themselves. But the case also poses an interesting economic question: Could the school districts have designed better auctions?

Bus...


SpaceX–Tesla: A Big Merger, but a Weak Antitrust Case?
SpaceX–Tesla: A Big Merger, but a Weak Antitrust Case? episode artwork
10/30/2026

What would really change if Tesla and SpaceX merged?

Rockets, vehicles, connectivity, energy storage, and AI. Those all sound consequential. But the size and the technological reach do not prove the merger would harm competition.

In this episode of EconWorks we examine possible concerns about blocking rivals, bundling products, and killing future competition—and why those theories don’t seem to have much support at the moment. We also discuss the possible benefits of common ownership for better engineering, investment coordination, and cost reduction.

The key question: What difference would ownership make that comp...


How Cartels Fool Sophisticated Buyers—and How AI Could Help
How Cartels Fool Sophisticated Buyers—and How AI Could Help episode artwork
10/29/2026

How can a cartel survive for years when its customers are sophisticated firms with substantial buying power? In episode 8 of How Cartels Really Work, we examine two large cases in history, the automobile parts cartels and the international vitamins cartel. Both involved suppliers selling to large businesses with professional purchasing departments. But some of these illegal agreements ran for a decade or more. Why didn’t their customers see the cartels? We begin with Costco’s buying practices. If suppliers want to raise their prices, Costco’s buyers examine the underlying costs and challenge any increases that don’t appear w...


SpaceX + Tesla: Would a Merger Harm Competition?
SpaceX + Tesla: Would a Merger Harm Competition? episode artwork
10/28/2026

What would really change if Tesla and SpaceX merge?

Rockets, vehicles, connectivity, energy storage, and AI. That sounds consequential. But the size and the technological reach are not evidence that the merger would harm competition.

In this episode of EconWorks we look at possible worries about blocking rivals, bundling products, and killing future competition—and why those theories don’t seem to have much support right now. We also discuss how common ownership might improve engineering, coordinate investment, and reduce costs.

The key question: What difference would ownership make that the companies cannot achi...


The Biggest Cartels You've Never Heard Of | Can AI Stop Them?
The Biggest Cartels You've Never Heard Of | Can AI Stop Them? episode artwork
10/27/2026

How can a cartel survive for years when its customers are sophisticated firms with large buying power? Episode 8 of How Cartels Really Work looks at two big cases in history: automobile parts cartels and the international vitamins cartel. Both were suppliers selling to large businesses with professional purchasing departments. But some of these illegal deals lasted for a decade or more. Why didn't their customers see the cartels? Let's start with Costco's buying practices. Costco’s buyers look at the underlying costs when suppliers want to raise their prices and push back on any increases that don’t seem just...


When Is a Discount a Wall?
When Is a Discount a Wall? episode artwork
10/23/2026

A discount is usually the shape of competition. But can the structure of a discount render the purchase of a cheaper rival more expensive?

This episode starts with a classic pricing problem in FTC v. Syngenta & Corteva. A company may charge more for units with high willingness to pay and less for additional units. It can be done through quantity discounts or nonlinear pricing. There is nothing wrong with that per se.

The puzzle starts when the rebate depends on the customer’s proportion of purchases from the seller, rather than just the total amount bo...


Why Cartels Collapse—and Why AI May Change That
Why Cartels Collapse—and Why AI May Change That episode artwork
10/22/2026

Cartels are unstable by nature. Members cheat, managers change, companies are sold, and participants can get away with less punishment by reporting the cartel before everybody else.

When AI encounters that familiar process, what happens next? Join us for episode 7. We start with the European MCAA cartel. Clariant acquired Hoechst’s chemicals business in 1997; the cartel continued for a while, and Clariant later discovered the conduct and reported it to the European Commission. The announcement triggered an investigation by the Commission. That history reveals a new source of cartel instability that has been overlooked: the firms may re...


When Is a Discount a Wall? | FTC v. Syngenta & Corteva
When Is a Discount a Wall? | FTC v. Syngenta & Corteva episode artwork
10/21/2026

Discounts always feel like competition. Lower prices should help the customer and make rivals respond. But what if a big rebate is contingent not just on how much a customer buys from a company but on how little it buys from its competitors?

In this episode of EconWorks, we examine the economics of loyalty discounts through FTC v. Syngenta & Corteva. Let’s start from the perspective of a pricing specialist. Quantity discounts and nonlinear pricing are perfectly normal responses to differences in willingness to pay.

The problem is not price discrimination per se. Then a ge...


Why Cartels Collapse—and Why AI May Change That | Cartels Episode 7
Why Cartels Collapse—and Why AI May Change That | Cartels Episode 7 episode artwork
10/20/2026

Why do cartels fall apart? The normal answer is cheat. A cartel member secretly cuts prices, another firm ratifies the deal, or someone runs to the authorities for leniency. But there’s another source of instability: organizations evolve.

In Episode 7 of *How Cartels Really Work* we examine the European MCAA cartel and Clariant’s takeover of Hoechst’s chemical business. The cartel survived the change of ownership for some time, but Clariant later uncovered the conduct through its compliance efforts and sought leniency, which sparked the European Commission’s investigation. And then, what if the same story has arti...


Why Is Everyone Moving Across the AI Stack?
Why Is Everyone Moving Across the AI Stack? episode artwork
10/16/2026

Why are AI companies moving across the stack?

Nvidia is moving toward developer platforms through Hugging Face.

AMD is moving toward model development through World Labs.

Cursor is moving upstream from the application layer toward the models and computation.

These moves all look like vertical integration, but the underlying economics may be entirely unique.

Nvidia may be trying to expand demand for compute. AMD may be trying to become a stronger competitor. Cursor may be trying to improve the application by controlling more of the technology underneath it.

<...


Can AI Raise Prices Without Colluding?
Can AI Raise Prices Without Colluding? episode artwork
10/15/2026

Suppose every business provides its AI with the same instruction: maximize our long-run profits, but obey the law.

The AI estimates demand, studies customer behavior, learns how competitors respond, and gradually discovers that some forms of aggressive competition are not very profitable.

A price cut may trigger another price cut. A promotion may trigger a competing promotion. Attempts to steal customers may provoke retaliation.

Eventually, each firm’s AI may independently decide to compete less aggressively.

But there is no agreement. The AIs never communicate. Nobody fixes a price.

In...


Why Is Everyone Moving Across the AI Stack?
Why Is Everyone Moving Across the AI Stack? episode artwork
10/14/2026

In this episode of EconWorks, we look at why some of the biggest AI companies are jumping across different layers of the AI stack. Nvidia transitions from compute to developer platforms via Hugging Face. World Labs is the pivot from compute to model development for AMD. Cursor sits near the application layer and flows upstream toward models and compute. All three moves look like vertical integration at first glance. But the economic logic is different in each of these cases. Nvidia may be trying to build demand for AI compute. Maybe AMD is trying to obtain better hardware, software...


What Happens When Every Firm Gets Better at Maximizing Profit?
What Happens When Every Firm Gets Better at Maximizing Profit? episode artwork
10/13/2026

What if every business told an AI one simple thing: **maximize long-term profit without breaking the law**?

A company today needs economists, salespeople, marketers, lawyers, finance departments, and managers. They have different information, different incentives, and often conflicting advice.

AI could well embed a lot of those functions into a much more disciplined profit-maximizing system. The result raises an odd antitrust issue. An artificial intelligence can learn that aggressive price cuts tend to trigger competitive responses. It may discover that promotions, expansions of capacity, or efforts to lure away customers provoke retaliation. It may therefore...


Two Vertical AI Deals
Two Vertical AI Deals episode artwork
10/09/2026

Nvidia is acquiring Hugging Face. AMD is buying World Labs. Both deals represent moves by chip companies further up the AI stack, but the economics could be entirely unique. Nvidia could benefit from Hugging Face increasing the number of developers, models, and apps that ultimately need AI compute. World Labs could give AMD more insight into future AI workloads and help it compete more effectively against Nvidia. So where's the antitrust injury?

In this episode we talk about why vertical integration alone is not a competitive problem. The more important question is what changes because of common...


Cartels, Episode 5: If Everyone Can Confess First, Why Form a Cartel?
Cartels, Episode 5: If Everyone Can Confess First, Why Form a Cartel? episode artwork
10/08/2026

Leniency programs are supposed to destabilize cartels by rewarding the first participant who comes forward. But that creates an intriguing game-theory puzzle.

If every cartel member knows that someone else could confess first, everyone has an incentive to move sooner. Backward induction seems to lead to an extreme prediction: confess immediately—and, therefore, never form the cartel.

Reality is different. Cartels still form.

This episode examines why. We distinguish cartel detection from deterrence, explain why successfully deterred cartels are largely invisible in the data, and connect leniency to the same problem explored in Ep...


Two Vertical AI Deals — But Where Is the Antitrust Harm?
Two Vertical AI Deals — But Where Is the Antitrust Harm? episode artwork
10/07/2026

In this episode of EconWorks we look at two big AI acquisitions—AMD’s deal for World Labs and Nvidia’s deal for Hugging Face. In both cases, chip firms are moving into adjacent parts of the AI stack, but they may be solving completely different economic problems.

Nvidia may be buying downstream to drive demand for AI compute. More developers may mean more models, more applications, and eventually more computing demand. Maybe AMD is buying downstream for another reason: to see what future AI workloads will look like and be a stronger competitor in AI compute.

T...


How Cartels Really Work, Episode 5: The Race to Confess
How Cartels Really Work, Episode 5: The Race to Confess episode artwork
10/06/2026

A leniency program appears to generate a straightforward game theory problem for cartels. Suppose some firms agree to collude. Each wants to make cartel profits, but each knows that another cartel member may go to the government first and seek leniency. So what are you waiting for?

If everyone wants to confess before everyone else, then backward induction makes the confession happen earlier and earlier. The logical prediction is surprising: the cartel should not form, in the end. But cartels do exist.

In Episode 5 of How Cartels Really Work, we examine the gap between that...


Why NVIDIA Is Betting $13 Billion on Open AI Models
Why NVIDIA Is Betting $13 Billion on Open AI Models episode artwork
10/02/2026

NVIDIA sells the computing power behind much of today’s AI boom. OpenAI and Anthropic are major sources of that demand. So why would NVIDIA spend nearly $13 billion acquiring Hugging Face, a platform that helps open models compete with them?

This episode uses a simple three-layer AI structure—chips, model development, and developer toolkits—to examine the economics of the deal.

Closed-model firms such as OpenAI and Anthropic integrate the model and toolkit layers. NVIDIA and Hugging Face would instead connect the chip layer below to the toolkit layer above, while leaving model development open to man...


How Do You Enforce an Illegal Agreement?
How Do You Enforce an Illegal Agreement? episode artwork
10/01/2026

Cartel members have a weird contracting problem: they can have a deal, but they can't rely on normal contract law to enforce it. This means cartels have to police themselves.

The episode explores why cartel members monitor one another, why cheating can be profitable for one cartel member, and why the threat of a return to competition can help sustain an anticompetitive agreement using the so-called shipping-container “Box Cartel.” The episode then moves to artificial intelligence.

An AI system can monitor deviations and react faster than human managers. It can respond to competitive punishment and redu...


Why NVIDIA Wants OpenAI to Have Competitors
Why NVIDIA Wants OpenAI to Have Competitors episode artwork
09/30/2026

NVIDIA sells the chips that companies like Anthropic and Open AI use. Now it is spending almost $13 billion to acquire Hugging Face, one of the most important platforms for open AI models. Is NVDIA trying to prop up the competition against OpenAI and Anthropic? The economics are more compelling than just a foreclosure story. In this episode, we examine two forms of vertical integration through the lens of a simplified AI supply chain, consisting of **chips → model development → developer toolkit**. OpenAI and Anthropic package models with their developer tools. Instead, NVIDIA and Hugging Face would combine the chip layer and...


How Do You Enforce an Illegal Agreement?
How Do You Enforce an Illegal Agreement? episode artwork
09/29/2026

The problem with a cartel is that its agreement is illegal. If a member of a cartel cheats, the other members can’t simply sue in court and get a judge to enforce the agreement. So cartels need their own systems of monitoring, detection, and punishment.

On this episode of How Cartels Really Work, we take a look at the economics of cartel discipline through the alleged shipping-container “Box Cartel,” which allegedly used production quotas, financial penalties, and 87 cameras across 49 production lines to ensure compliance.

What is surprising is the punishment. If a cartel member cheats...


When Delivery Meets Cash-and-Carry
When Delivery Meets Cash-and-Carry episode artwork
09/25/2026

Sysco is planning to buy Jetro Restaurant Depot. But this is not a normal horizontal merger. Sysco delivers food to restaurants, mainly. Restaurant Depot operates cash-and-carry warehouse-based stores. Those channels may serve very different needs for large restaurant chains.

Both, however, could be good choices for small, independent restaurants. That raises a simple antitrust question: do the two channels actually check each other? Maybe the answer lies in Sysco’s own experiment in Houston. Prior to the Jetro acquisition, Sysco had opened cash-and-carry stores called Sysco To Go to serve smaller foodservice customers.

If Restaurant De...


Can Data Reveal a Cartel? The Nasdaq Missing Eighths
Can Data Reveal a Cartel? The Nasdaq Missing Eighths episode artwork
09/24/2026

How can economists find a cartel if there is no agreement? Nasdaq stocks were quoted in eighths of a dollar in the early 1990s. But economists discovered that for many heavily traded stocks, half of those potential price increments were rarely used. This pattern became known as the Nasdaq “missing eighth.”

The research was made public, the dealers acted quickly, and the spreads tightened. Later investigation unearthed evidence that reached far beyond the initial statistical anomaly.

In Episode 3 of How Cartels Really Work, we take this episode to discuss a fundamental distinction in antitrust economics: empi...


When Delivery Meets Cash-and-Carry: The Sysco–Jetro Antitrust Test
When Delivery Meets Cash-and-Carry: The Sysco–Jetro Antitrust Test episode artwork
09/23/2026

The proposed acquisition of Jetro Restaurant Depot by Sysco seems very different from the failed merger between Sysco and US Foods. Sysco mainly ships food to restaurants. Restaurant Depot operates on a cash-and-carry basis, meaning the restaurant owners come and pick up the food themselves.

But different channels don’t necessarily mean different competition. Delivery may be a must for a large restaurant or national chain. But for a smaller independent restaurant, the choice may be between paying for delivery or doing some of the logistics itself. That means the overlap is critical for smaller restaurants. And Ho...


Can Data Reveal a Cartel? | The Nasdaq Missing Eighths
Can Data Reveal a Cartel? | The Nasdaq Missing Eighths episode artwork
09/22/2026

In the early 1990s, Nasdaq stocks were quoted in eighths of a dollar. $20.00, $20.125, $20.25, $20.375, etc.

But economists William Christie and Paul Schultz found an odd pattern. For many actively traded stocks, market makers mostly used even eighths. Instead, prices acted as if quotes were changing in quarter-dollar increments.

Why? Because?

The empirical evidence alone cannot prove that dealers agreed to keep spreads wider. But once the research was released, odd-eighth quotes started to show up, and spreads tightened considerably.

Then government investigators dug deeper, finding evidence that went far beyond the original...


When AI Replaces the Research Team
When AI Replaces the Research Team episode artwork
09/18/2026

To summarize, AI might soon grant a single researcher access to much of the capacity that used to belong to an entire academic team: theory, coding, empirical analysis, data work, writing, and project management. That opens a more profound question: what if every economist owns a research factory? This episode is about more than the simple idea that AI will help academics write more papers.

Research factories are about efficiency, not output maximization. They could enable researchers to explore ideas sooner, to kill weak projects sooner, to explore strong ideas more fully, and to concentrate on the...


Why Price Fixing Is Easier to Describe Than to Prove
Why Price Fixing Is Easier to Describe Than to Prove episode artwork
09/17/2026

Picture two gas stations across the street from each other. One increases its price. The other one follows. And it happens over and over again. The pattern looks funny. But does it prove price-fixing?

In episode 2 of How Cartels Really Work, we explain why it is a lot harder to prove a cartel than it is to describe one.

We follow six observations that make the hypothetical case incrementally more compelling: simultaneous price increases, repeated matching, prices rising independently of costs, communications between competitors, increasing specificity of discussions, and finally evidence of an agreement. The...


What Happens When Every Economist Has a Research Factory?
What Happens When Every Economist Has a Research Factory? episode artwork
09/16/2026

What if every economist had an AI research factory? Academic research has often been a team effort, with complementary skills: theory, empirical work, coding, data management, writing, and project management.

Many of those capabilities are increasingly available to a single researcher on demand via AI. But it doesn’t mean the aim is to produce as many papers as possible.

In this episode, we explore how AI might change the organization of academic research, why Brooks’s Law remains true inside an AI research factory, and why efficiency should be measured by the quality of the...


Why Price Fixing Is Easier to Describe Than to Prove | Cartels Ep. 2
Why Price Fixing Is Easier to Describe Than to Prove | Cartels Ep. 2 episode artwork
09/15/2026

Two gas stations simultaneously raise their prices. And then they do it again. Their prices have not changed much. Their owners have been even talking. Is that enough evidence of price-fixing?

In episode 2 of How Cartels Really Work, we take a look at one of the key issues in cartel enforcement: the line between suspicious parallel behavior and evidence of an agreement.

Starting with a simple example of a gas station, we move through six observations of increasing importance. This includes simultaneous price increases and repeated matching, as well as competitor communications and evidence of...


Zillow–Redfin: Keep the Cooperation, Restore the Rivalry
Zillow–Redfin: Keep the Cooperation, Restore the Rivalry episode artwork
09/11/2026

The Zillow-Redfin case never went to court. Instead, the FTC, five states, Zillow, and Redfin agreed to a settlement that does something more interesting than just unwind the deal. Zillow can continue syndicating rental listings to Redfin, maintaining the cooperation the companies say yields efficiencies. But Redfin needs to rebuild its own rental-advertising business and re-emerge as an independent competitor. This episode asks what the settlement tells us about the economics of antitrust remedy. Did the earlier lawsuit assist both parties in reassessing the risks of trial? Why would Zillow want to do a competitor a favor? And can...


How Cartels Really Work, Episode 1: What Makes Something a Cartel?
How Cartels Really Work, Episode 1: What Makes Something a Cartel? episode artwork
09/10/2026

Two gas stations competing with each other charge $4.50 each.

That alone does not tell us whether they formed a cartel.

They may incur the same costs. They may react to each other’s prices independently. Repeated interaction may teach them not to start price wars. Economists might refer to the result as tacit collusion.

Or they may have conspired to set prices. In the first episode of How Cartels Really Work, EconWorks explores the boundary between competition and cartel behavior—and why the economic outcome alone can’t tell us where firms fall on tha...