Collect Call with Lawstache

The government argues that we should credit Jankowski's testimony because of his nineteen years of experience as a police officer and thousands of hours of "stash house" surveillance. But while courts analyze the facts leading to an investigatory stop in light of a trained officer's experience, these facts must be "more than the mere subjective impressions of a particular officer." Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d at 1416. Reasonable suspicion must be based on more than an officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.' " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).  

Here, Jankowski testified that the dropping of marijuana packages -onto what s...

On November 12, 1999, at approximately 2:05 a.m., Sergeant Thomas Carmichael observed a blue Honda traveling at 70 m.p.h. northbound in the right lane on Interstate 15. Carmichael first observed the Honda from his patrol car, which was positioned 75 yards behind it. He observed the car drift onto the solid white fog line on the far side of the right lane and watched the car's wheels travel along the fog line for approximately ten seconds. The Honda then drifted to the left side of the right lane, signaled a lane change, and moved into the left lane. Carmichael next observed the...

Few statements in the law are as often repeated: "[A]n investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith." ( In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957].) The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures dictates that traffic stops must be supported by articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver or a passenger has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. ( People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785].) In this case, the police...

The starting point for our analysis of whether the INS had reasonable suspicion to stop Serrano is United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibits INS roving patrols from stopping vehicles in areas near but not at the Mexican border or its functional equivalent and from questioning a vehicle's occupants as to citizenship absent a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal aliens.
 Id. at 882, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. Such a reasonable suspicion must be supported by “specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences fro...

Neither the holding nor logic of Cady justifies such warrantless searches and seizures in the home. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the officers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to discharge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. 413 U. S., at 441. But searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different, as the Cady opinion repeatedly stressed. Id., at 439, 440– 442. The very core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of...

The panel reversed the district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from warrantless searches of his cell phone by Customs and Border Protection officials, and vacated his conviction for importing cocaine.

Applying United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9thCir. 2013) (en banc), the panel held that manual cell phone searches maybe conducted by border officials without reasonable suspicion but that forensic cell phone searches require reasonable suspicion. The panel clarified Cotterman by holding that “reasonable suspicion” in this context means that officials must reasonably suspect that the cell phone contains digital contraband. The pane...

The latest available data from the Justice Department show that during January 2025 the government reported 3196 new immigration prosecutions. According to the case-by-case information analyzed by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), this number is up 2.5 percent over the previous month.

See the full reports here: https://tracreports.org/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjan25/fil/

Anton Vialtsin, Esq.
LAWSTACHE™ LAW FIRM | Criminal Defense and Business Law
https://lawstache.com
(619) 357-6677

Do you want to buy our Lawstache merchandise? Maybe a t-shirt?
https://lawstache.com/merch/

Want to ma...

Jesus Munguia Mendoza appeals the sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Mendoza contends that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked legal authority under the Sentencing Guidelines to depart downward on the ground that Mendoza had no control over, or knowledge of, the purity of the methamphetamine that he delivered. We agree that, under the sentencing principles set forth in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)—a decision of which the district court did not have the...

Respondent Mena and others were detained in handcuffs during a search of the premises they occupied. Petitioners were lead members of a police detachment executing a search warrant of these premises for, inter alia, deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers under 42 U. S. C. §1983, and the District Court found in her favor. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the use of handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers’ questioning of Mena about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation.

HEL...

The Fourth Amendment specifically requires a warrant to include a description of the “place to be searched.” The police officers here—at first—complied with that requirement, obtaining a warrant that listed a motel room suspected of being a hub for drug trafficking. The officers then decided to search the suspect’s home as well, and asked the judge over the phone to expand the scope of the warrant to include the home. The judge agreed, but the officers did not physically amend the warrant.

We agree with the district court that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment...

Respondents' private residence was damaged by an early morning fire while they were out of town. Firefighters extinguished the blaze at 7:04 a.m., at which time all fire officials and police left the premises. Five hours later, a team of arson investigators arrived at the residence for the first time to investigate the cause of the blaze. They found a work crew on the scene boarding up the house and pumping water out of the basement. The investigators learned that respondents had been notified of the fire and had instructed their insurance agent to send the crew to secure...

This case presents the question whether a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver’s license. 

Under this Court’s precedents, the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418 (1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). “Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the stan...

During the investigation of two traffic incidents involving an orange and black motorcycle with an extended frame, Officer David Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Ryan Collins. Officer Rhodes discovered photographs on Collins' Facebook profile of an orange and black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house, drove to the house, and parked on the street. From there, he could see what appeared to be the motorcycle under a white tarp parked in the same location as the motorcycle in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Office Rhodes walked to...

Before Officer Nichols could pull over petitioner, petitioner parked and got out of his car. Nichols then parked, accosted petitioner, and arrested him after finding drugs in his pocket. Incident to the arrest, Nichols searched petitioner’s car and found a handgun under the driver’s seat. Petitioner was charged with federal drug and firearms violations. In denying his motion to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unconstitutional search, the District Court found, inter alia, the automobile search valid under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, in which this Court held that, when a police officer makes a la...

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), is a Supreme Court case addressing the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.

Facts:

Marc Doggett was indicted in 1980 for drug-related charges. Shortly after the indictment, he left the United States. While authorities knew he was in Colombia and later Panama, they failed to apprehend him due to logistical issues. In 1982, Doggett returned to the U.S. unnoticed and lived openly for the next six years. He was arrested in 1988, but during this time, he had no knowledge of the indictment.

A police officer looked in an apartment window through a gap in the closed blind and observed respondents Carter and Johns and the apartment's lessee bagging cocaine. After respondents were arrested, they moved to suppress, inter alia, cocaine and other evidence obtained from the apartment and their car, arguing that the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Respondents were convicted of state drug offenses. The Minnesota trial court held that since they were not overnight social guests, they were not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, and that the officer's observation was not...

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause/Vehicular Tows 

The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City of Portland in an action brought by Andrew Grimm alleging that the City’s procedures for notifying him that his car would be towed were deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Grimm parked a car on the side of a downtown street, paid for an hour and 19 minutes of parking through a mobile app, and then left the car on the street for seven days. During that time, City parking enforcement officers issued multipl...

Thank you all for an incredible year! I experienced the biggest surge in viewership, and it’s all because of your amazing support in sharing my videos. A special thank you to everyone who purchased my Do Not Arrest This Person t-shirts—you’ve made this journey even more rewarding! ~ Anton V. aka LAWSTACHE

1. NOT a crime for citizen to refuse entry to her home to police who do not have an appropriate warrant

https://youtu.be/IazZorTNtA8

Read the full case here: United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978), https://casetext.com/ca...

Ultimately, the Court is presented with two facts: (1) Mr. Russell consumed marijuana at least two hours before the stop; and (2) Mr. Russell may have had bloodshot, watery eyes and/or droopy eyelids. These facts put this matter on all fours with Patzer, where the driver was observed only to have “bloodshot and glassy eyes” and admitted to smoking marijuana. 277 F.3d at 1082. Under the Idaho law at issue in that case, the government was required to show that the defendant was under the influence “to a degree which impairs the driver's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.” Id. at 1084...

May officers, as a matter of standard procedure and in the name of "officer safety," detain and frisk a driver stopped for an equipment infraction solely on the basis that the stop occurs in a high crime area at night? Here we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not permit such an intrusion and that any incriminating evidence flowing from the illegal contact, which may include statements made by the driver, is inadmissible.

Roman Medina appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found on his person and in his vehicle, as well...

Most of us nowadays carry a cell phone. And our phones frequently contain information chronicling our daily lives—where we go, whom we see, what we say to our friends, and the like. When a person is suspected of a crime, his phone thus can serve as a fruitful source of evidence, especially if he committed the offense in concert with others with whom he might communicate about it. Does this mean that, whenever officers have reason to suspect a person of involvement in a crime, they have probable cause to search his home for cell phones because he mi...

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a “seizure” of “persons” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007) (holding that passengers as well as the driver are seized during a traffic stop). Therefore it must be reasonable. At its inception, a traffic stop is reasonable if there was probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, regardless of the officer's subjective motivation for making the stop. Whren v. United States, 517...

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When determining whether someone’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, “the ultimate touchstone . . . is ‘reasonableness.’ ” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)
(citations omitted). Even an initial seizure based on probable cause “can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (citation omitted). “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop w...

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ...  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures.”U.S.  Const.amend.  IV.    A  traffic  stop constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.  Whren  v.  United  States,  517  U.S.  806, 809–10 (1996);Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).  The reasonableness of a traffic stop  depends  on  whether  the  police  have  reasonable  suspicion  to  believe  that  a  traffic  violation has occurred.  Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).  

A  traffic  stop  that  is  constitutionally  inbounds  at  its  inception  could  eventually  impinge on the vehicle occupant’s rights in some circumstances.  If an officer executes a traffic stop unreasonably, the stop...

Responding to a report of suspicious activity in the area, a police officer unlawfully detained a bystander who had no apparent connection to the report. The officer ran a records search and learned that the bystander, Duvanh Anthony McWilliams, was on parole and subject to warrantless, suspicionless parole searches. The officer proceeded to search McWilliams and his vehicle, where the officer found an unloaded gun, ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia.

As a general rule, evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure is inadmissible against the defendant in a subsequent prosecution. But the law...

Following denial of his suppression motion, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for sale. Defendant had approached the Needles, California plant quarantine inspection station in a vehicle bearing Michigan license plates. The quarantine officer, feeling that a more detailed inspection was necessary, identified himself and requested to look into defendant's vehicle trunk. Defendant opened the trunk for the officer's inspection. Inside were 200 to 300 pounds of marijuana wrapped in plastic. The officer reached in and took a pinch of the substance to inspect it. He discussed the substance with defendant and they agreed that it appeared to be compost...

Police stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover "ordinary criminal wrongdoing." The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

Does Indianapolis v. Edmond, which dealt with the Fourth and 14th Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibit checkpoints organized to question motorists about a previous...

Homeland Security Investigations and Customs and Border Protection have credible information that an individual in the Baja California border region (the “Recruiter”) has placed help wanted advertisements on Facebook seeking persons to transport currency across the border.

Credible information indicates at least some individuals who responded to the ads and drove vehicles across the border were not told they were instead smuggling aliens into the United States.

Based on the investigation, there are a few common characteristics linked to the Recruiter:
􀁸 After a person responds to one of the advertisements, they typically encounter a person...

We review questions of probable cause de novo, but with "due weight to inferences drawn from [the] facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Ornelas v. United States,517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). We need only find that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Illinois v. Gates,462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In making this determination, a magistrate judge must assess the totality of the circumstances and make a "practical, common-sense decision." Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Under the totality of the circumstances test, otherwise innocent behavior may be...

Upon this evidence, and knowing that the box was at the airport in the possession of DEA agents, the magistrate issued a warrant for a search of Hendrick's residence at N. Sidney. Although the warrant states that "on the premises known as 2835 N. Sidney . . . there is now being concealed . . . a . . . cardboard box [containing cocaine]," (emphasis added) it further states "this search warrant is to be executed only upon the condition that the above described box is brought to the aforesaid premises" (emphasis added).

In making the determination as to probable cause, our role is limited to "ensuring...

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed searches of homes of suspected drug dealers even where there is no direct evidence linking the homes to illegal activity, because the presence of evidence in a drug dealer's home is a reasonable inference to draw. See, e.g., United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1381–82 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Angulo–Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1985). The government argues that this caselaw can and should be extended to drug users, especially since Inspector Lau stated in his affidavit that it is “common” for drug users to have...

The general rule in the Ninth Circuit concerning knock and talk encounters is:

Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man's "castle" with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof-whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law. Davis v. United States, 327...

It is well established that, even when officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is present in a home, a warrantless search of the home is unlawful unless exigent circumstances exist at the time of entry. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The government bears the burden of demonstrating exigent circumstances that overcome their presumptively unreasonable entry. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). And exigency is determined at the moment the search occurs. See United States...

The purpose behind the decision to impound is crucial because of the reason for condoning inventory searches of impounded cars. "In the interests  of public safety and as part of what the Court has called `community caretaking functions,' [citation], automobiles are frequently taken into police custody." ( Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 368.) "When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles' contents. These procedures developed in response to three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, [citation]; the protection of the police a...

Petitioner city operates vehicle checkpoints on its roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. 

The District Court denied respondents a preliminary injunction, but the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the checkpoints contravened the Fourth Amendment.

Held: Because the checkpoint program's primary purpose is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 37-48.

(a) The rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing has limited exceptions. For example, this Court has upheld brief, suspicionless seizures at a f...

Because the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), Davis must first demonstrate that he personally had a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place searched or the thing seized. Rakas v. Illinois,439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).

If the Fourth Amendment does not protect Davis' expectation of privacy in the contents of his bag, stored under the bed in an apartment where he sleeps and keeps his belongings, we find it difficult to imagine what the Fourth Amendment does protect. 

Having determined t...

As a general matter, “police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supportedby articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” 

At the outset, we note that the Supreme Court has held “actual” roadside drug checkpoints are unconstitutional. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,531 U.S. 32, 48, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), the Court held that a narcotics checkpoint whose primary purpose “is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control” violates the Fourth Amendment. In that case, Indianapolis police had established v...

As an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, "police may, without a warrant, impound and search a motor vehicle so long as they do so in conformance with the standardized procedures of the local police department and in furtherance of a community caretaking purpose, such as promoting public safety or the efficient flow of traffic." United States v. Torres , 828 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016). The purpose of such a search is to "produce an inventory" of the items in the car, in order "to protect an owner's property while it is in...

This court recognized the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in United States v. Cervantes,219 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2000). In Cervantes, this court held that the emergency exception doctrine justified an officer's entry into an apartment to investigate a chemical smell associated with methamphetamine production. Id. at 891. We applied the doctrine in Cervantes because (1) the police had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and that there was an immediate need for their assistance, (2) the search was not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence, and (3) the police had a...

Around midday on December 7, 2004, three uniformed police officers entered the fenced-in backyard of a private home in a residential neighborhood of Portland. Guns drawn, but without a warrant, one scaled the fence and another kicked open a padlocked gate leading into the backyard. The only information the officers had at that time was (1) a call from a neighbor reporting that the owners were at work and that a white male wearing a black jacket, age unknown, had thrown a red backpack over the fence and climbed into the backyard; and (2) their visual confirmation that a fed backpack was lying...